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Should Prudential Standing
Requirements Be Applied in Transferred
Impact Sexual Harassment Cases? An
Analysis of Childress v. City of Richmond
Robert J. Aalberts*
Lorne H. Seidman**
I. INTRODUCTION
Childress v. City of Richmond was decided by three members of the federal
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit during the summer of 1997.1 Their
unanimous decision held that white male police officers, who alleged injury as the
result of highly derogatory comments made by their supervisor degrading female
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and business journals, including the American Business Law Journal, Georgetown Journal of Legal
Ethics, DePaul Law Review, Marquette Law Review, Louisiana Law Review, Pepperdine Law Review,
Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Southern University Law Review, Labor Law Journal, the
Journal of Small Business Management, Employee Relations Law Journal, International Journal of
Conflict Management, the Benefits Law Journal and others. Professor Aalberts is currently the editor-
in-chief of the Real Estate Law Journal and is a co-author of the textbook LAW AND BUSINESS AND THE
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT (4th ed. 1994).
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Employee Relations Law Journal, International Journal of Conflict Management, and the Journal of
Small Business Management.
1. 120 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'dper curiam, 134 F.3d 1205 (1998) (en banc), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 2322 (1998) [hereinafter Childress 1].
and black officers,' had standing to allege a sexually hostile environment under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' In September 1997 the appellate court
granted a rehearing en banc,4 and in January 1998 the Fourth Circuit issued a new
opinion.' This en banc decision overruled the three judge panel and affirmed in
full the decision of the district court,6 which had earlier dismissed the plaintiff's
case as a same-sex hostile environment theory.' But, despite being overruled, the
holding in Childress I may pose considerable problems for employers that could
spread with significant consequences It has already attracted the attention of the
2. The remarks made by the supervisor were so clearly derogatory that the authors feel there is no
need to repeat them here.
3. See Childress 1, 120 F.3d at 478; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1994) [hereinafter Title VI1. The court specifically held that "the officers may state hostile
environment claims under Title VI for discrimination directed at black and female officers." Id. The
court further stated,
We believe we should begin by examining the Court's reasoning in Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. to determine whether the Supreme Court's recognition of
associational rights under Title VIII militates in favor of conferring a comparable
discriminatory-environment cause of action on men to complain about discrimination directed
at women .. "
Id. at 480 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The authors submit that a more descriptive term than
the term "discriminatory-environment" used in Childress I, is "transferred impact." The word
"transferred" is borrowed from the tort concept of "transferred intent." Transferred intent is invoked
when "[t]he defendant who shoots or strikes at A, intending to wound or kill A, and unforeseeably hits
B instead, is held liable to B for an intentional tort." See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 8, at 37 (5th ed. 1984). The analogy in Childress I cases occurs when the harasser
unforeseeably creates a hostile work environment for males. The second term, "impact," is borrowed
from the concept of "disparate impact," or "impact analysis." See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 435-36 (1971) (holding that an intelligence test unrelated to job performance that harmed a
disproportionate number of black employees violated Title VII despite lack of employer's intent to
discriminate). Under disparate impact analysis, a particular employment practice, such as height and
weight requirements, which adversely affects employment opportunities for a protected class, is deemed
illegal. Proof of intent to discriminate, however, is not required. See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW, § 5.41, at 356 (1988). In a transferred impact case, the sexual harasser's
conduct, although not intended to harass white males, adversely impacts this protected group.
4. See Childress 1, 120 F.3d at 476.
5. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2322
(1998) [hereinafter Childress II].
6. See id. at 1207 ("We affirm the district court's judgment in its entirety. Dismissal of the Title
VII 'hostile environment' claim and the 'participation clause' and 'opposition clause' retaliation claims
is affirmed by an equally divided vote of the en banc court.").
7. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D. Va. 1995) (dismissing the
defendants' hostile environment sexual harassment case based on the theory that it was a same-sex
sexual harassment claim). The district court noted that "[tihe Fourth Circuit has not yet decided the
same-sex issue, but the prevailing view is that Title VII addresses only discrimination between the
sexes." Id. The second Childress district court case allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to
add a defendant and to allege retaliation for their assistance to the female police officers. See Childress
v. City of Richmond, 919 F. Supp. 216, 218 (E.D. Va. 1996).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 178-98 (discussing possible increases in already high sexual
harassment litigation, as well as the potential effects on already strained judicial resources).
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legal press 9 and scholarly comment. °
A subsequent legal development gives even greater import to the Childress I
holding. In March, 1998, the Supreme Court, in the case of Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services," issued a ruling revealing that same-sex sexual harassment is
covered under Title VII,' 2 thereby undermining the reasoning in Childress ii.
13
Thus, in light of the Oncale decision, courts ruling in future Childress type
transferred impact cases will no longer be able to dismiss based on that theory, and
will instead be compelled to address the issue of judicial standing.
Clearly within the Fourth Circuit, the Childress case, from beginning to end,
has endured an arduous if not tortured history."' There has been rigorous
disagreement among jurists over the thought-provoking problem this case presents.
Opinions have ranged from granting judicial standing to the Childress plaintiffs 5
to denying it,'6 with three appellate judges, in a concurring opinion, making a
distinction between the prudential standing requirements of Title VII and Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.'" In all, there have been four Childress decisions,
grappling, in part, with the issue of judicial standing."8 Yet none of them scratch
the itch.
The purpose of this Article is to propose a solution to the confusion created by
an array of judicial reasoning over the issue of standing to pursue transferred
9. See, e.g., Dawn E. Conner, Blacks, Women Are Harassed; White Men Sue Under Title VII,
LAW. WKLY U.S.A., Aug. 25, 1997, at 1, 20; Wendal Ford, White Officers May Sue Under Title VII,
83 A.B.A. J. 41 (1997); Alan Cooper, White Males Can Bring Title VII Suits, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18,
1997, at B 1; 4th Cir. to Decide if Racial Epithets Created Hostile Environment for Whites, EMPLOY.
Lr. REP., Feb. 11, 1997, at 21789.
10. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691,
756 n.345 (1997) (disapproving of the fact that the courts have ruled that "conduct which offends both
men and women might be obnoxious, but it is not sexually discriminatory.") (citing Childress, 907 F.
Supp. 934).
11. 118S.Ct.998(1998).
12. See id. at 1002 ("We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a
categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VI.").
13. See Childress 11, 134 F.3d at 476; see also supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. In the
Childress case, the district court noted that although the Fourth Circuit had not yet decided whether
same-sex sexual harassment was covered under Title VII, three district courts in that circuit had ruled
that it was not. See Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 934. See generally Joanna P.L. Mangum, Wrightson
v. Pizza Hut of America Inc.: The Fourth Circuit's "Simple Logic" of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
Under Title VII, 76 N.C. L. REV. 306 (1997) (discussing Fourth Circuit's treatment of same-sex sexual
harassment prior to the Oncale case).
14. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
15. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17. See Childress If, 134 F.3d 1205, 1209-10 (4th Cir. 1998) (Luttig, J., concurring).
18. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
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impact discriminatory-environment sexual harassment cases. This is a solution
reserved by decisions in other circuits, 9 the provisions of Title VII itself2" and the
real state of congressional intent when Title VII became law.2" A discussion of
how such claims, if they become widespread, may place a strain on judicial
resources will also be noted.22 We focus primarily on the issue of standing to
pursue workplace sexual hostile environment claims when the actions undergirding
the claims are directed at individuals of the opposite sex.23 Claims of alleged racial
discrimination must also be reviewed in some detail; they are the geneses of
Childress L Two cases, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.24 and
Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc.25 are of capital importance.
Over twenty years ago two tenants in a San Francisco apartment complex
alleged that their landlord discriminated against blacks in violation of Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968.26 One tenant was black, the other white; neither were
direct victims of the landlord's alleged practices.27 Both, however,
claimed they had been injured in that (1) they had lost the social benefits of living
in an integrated community; (2) they had missed business and professional
advantages which would have accrued if they had lived with members of minority
groups; (3) they had suffered embarrassment and economic damage in social,
business, and professional activities from being "stigmatized" as residents of a
"white ghetto."2
These allegations resulted in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 29
19. See infra text accompanying notes 127-47.
20. See infra notes text accompanying notes 162-77.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 148-61.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 178-98.
23. This Article will not address directly the race issue raised by the plaintiffs in the Childress
cases. See, e.g., Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 934 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("This case
presents the question of whether a white or male worker can state a civil rights claim for a supervisor's
hostility to blacks or women."). It is the authors' contention that Title VII accords standing to whites
to assert loss of interracial associations to the full limit allowed under Article nM of the Constitution.
See infra text accompanying notes 30-65.
24. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
25. 445 F.2d 442 (3rd Cir. 1971).
26. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 206-07 (citing Title VIof the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (also called
the Fair Housing Act), 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619, 3631 (1995 & Supp. 1998)).
27. See id. at 206-08.
28. Id. at 208.
29. See id. at 205.
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II. Is THERE STANDING TO ALLEGE INJURY AS THE RESULT OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ANOTHER UNDER TITLE VIII AND TITLE VII?
Courts exist to resolve disputes. They do not provide a general superinten-
dency over all discontent in an unjust World.3" To the contrary, Article III of the
Constitution of the United States creates the concept and requirement of "standing
to sue."'" Fundamentally this doctrine requires that plaintiffs seeking to invoke the
aid of a court must establish that they are adversely affected in a real way.32
Furthermore, standing must be established before a court reaches the merits of a
case.33 In addition to Article III requirements, 34 courts, in the interest of judicial
self-restraint, may also consider prudential standing requirements." While there
is no complete list of prudential rules, the Supreme Court, according to one
commentator, often refers to three:36 "(1) litigants should not assert the rights of
third parties; (2) litigants should not assert 'generalized grievances'; and (3) the
30. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (noting that the gist of the question of
standing is whether the parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues.") (emphasis added);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972) ("Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is what has
traditionally been referred to as the question of standing .... ).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority .... ).
32. See John C. Yang, Standing in the Doorway of Justice, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1356, 1359
(1991) ("At a minimum, plaintiffs must meet three requirements to establish standing: (1) a distinct
and palpable injury; (2) an injury fairly traceable to the government action being challenged; and (3)
an injury redressable by judicial action. These three requirements form the basis of Article III, or
constitutional standing.") (citing Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979);
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1979); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1977)).
33. One commentator likens standing to a metaphorical "door" which a plaintiff must pass through
before he or she can litigate a claim. See Yang, supra note 32, at 1356.
34. It should be noted that Congress, through legislation, has the authority to remove all prudential
standing requirements. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. at 109 (concluding that the Fair
Housing Act extends to race discrimination cases to the full limit permitted under the Constitution); see
also Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 (ruling that standing should be applied to race discrimination cases
under Title VIII "as broadly as is permitted by Article Ill of the Constitution").
35. The public policy underlying prudential standing is to "prevent the erosion of public confidence
on which its power depends and in recognition of the need for a smoothly-run majoritarian
government." See John J. Egan I, Note, Analyzing Taxpayer Standing in Terms of General Standing
Principles: The Road Not Taken, 63 B.U. L. REV. 717, 727 (1983).
36. See Michael E. Rosman, Standing Alone: Standing Under the Fair Housing Act, 60 Mo. L.
REV. 547, 551 (1995) ("Although the Court has never claimed to set forth a complete list of these
prudential rules it frequently mentions three .... ).
injury claimed should be in the 'zone of interests' of the statute or provision in
question."37 When these issues arise, courts may consider such concerns as
"separation of powers, congressional intent, court congestion and limitations on
judicial resources" before granting a plaintiff standing to sue.38
In Trafficante, the district court did not reach the merits.39 It held that
"petitioners were not within the class of persons entitled to sue under the Act."4 °
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, construing the Act to "permit
complaints only by persons who are the objects of discriminatory... practices."'"
Trafficante then proceeded to the Supreme Court of the United States and was
decided in December of 1972.42
A unanimous Court reversed the lower courts.43  The Supreme Court
concluded that "tenants of the same housing unit that is charged with discrimina-
tion" have standing to sue. 44 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 4" the Court
explained, protects "not only those against whom a discrimination is directed but
also those whose complaint is that the manner of managing a housing project
affects the very quality of their daily lives."4 This decision accepted a construction
of Title VIII advocated by the Assistant Regional Administrator of HUD; that
given the limited jurisdiction and resources of the Attorney General in Title VIII
matters, the "main generating force" must be aggrieved individuals47 performing
37. Id. at 551; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
38. See Yang, supra note 32, at 1361. However, it should be emphasized that prudential standards
"vary depending on the action being challenged." Id.; see also Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479
U.S. 388,400 n.16 (1987) (noting that there is no single prudential inquiry which can be applied to all
actions). As one commentator points out concerning the Trafficante case, the "Court concluded that
Congress intended to eliminate the prudential barriers to standing relying on three pieces of evidence:
(1) the language of the standing provision of Section 3610 [of Title VIM, (2) the legislative history, and
(3) the enforcement mechanisms of the statute." See Rosman, supra note 36, at 597. See infra text
accompanying notes 136-98 for discussion regarding how judicial resources may be considered when
prudential standing requirements are applied to a discriminatory-environment sexual harassment case.
39. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 205.
43. See id. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion; Justice White filed a concurring opinion in which
Justices Blackmun and Powell joined. See id. The three concurring Justices joined in reluctantly:
"Absent the Civil Rights Act of 1968, I would have great difficulty in concluding that petitioners'
complaint in this case presented a case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court under
Art. III of the Constitution." Id. at 212 (White, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 209.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1995 & Supp. 1998) [hereinafter Title VII].
46. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211 (citation omitted).
47. See id. at 211. The Court was influenced by legislative history, in particular by a speech in
which Senator Javitts stated,
The additional factor in housing is that not only is the individual purchaser or renter generally
the head of a family, the father or the husband, not only is his individual dignity affected, but
when we deal with housing we also deal with it in the view and presence of the man's whole
family, to whom he becomes nothing, as well as the whole community in which he either lives
266
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as "private attorneys general."48
In reaching its decision the Court determined that the concept of an aggrieved
person, as specified in Title VIII, includes "[a]ny person who claims to have been
injured by a discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be
irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur."'4 9
The Trafficante decision thus revealed associational rights under Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.50 And it did more.5"
In reaching its decision in Trafficante the Supreme Court gratuitously went
beyond Title VIII by adopting a quote from Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc.
52
In Hackett, the court resolved an issue regarding standing for race discrimination
or to which he chooses to move.
114 Cong. Rec. 2706 (Feb. 8, 1968) (emphasis added); see infra text accompanying notes 127-47
(discussing in more detail some of the foregoing cases).
48. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211 (noting that the "role of 'private attorneys general' is not
uncommon in modem legislative programs").
49. Id. at 206 n.3 (citing Title VIII, § 810(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1994)).
50. See id. at 209. The term "associational rights" has its conceptual birth in Trafficante. See id.
at 209-10 ("The alleged injury to existing tenants by exclusion of minority persons from the apartment
complex is the loss of important benefits from interracial associations.") (emphasis added).
51. The concept of associational rights, first articulated in Trafficante, appears in related cases
involving employment discrimination under Title VII. See, e.g., Childress I, 120 F.3d 476, 480 (4th
Cir. 1997), rev'd per curiam 134 F.3d 1205 (1998) ("[We believe we should begin by examining the
Court's reasoning in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., to determine whether the Supreme
Court's recognition of associational rights under Title VIII militates in favor of conferring a
comparable discriminatory-environment cause of action on men to complain about discrimination
directed at women, or on white person to complain of similar treatment of blacks.") (citations omitted)
(emphasis added); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 856 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Since the exclusion of a
minority person from a work environment can lead to the loss of important benefits from interracial
associations, the complaint sufficiently apprized the parties and the court of the claimed injury.")
(emphasis added); EEOC v. Bailey Co., Inc., 563 F.2d 439, 453 (6th Cir. 1977) ("The fact that
Trafficante thus approved the reasoning of this Title VII case further demonstrates that on this issue of
standing the Supreme Court does not conceive Titles VII or VIII to be different and that under both
Titles VII or VIII a person can be aggrieved from the loss of benefits from the lack of interracial
associations.") (emphasis added); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976) ("We
have no doubt that one of the purposes of Title VII is the purpose stated by the district court. But
interpersonal contacts-between members of the same or different races-are no less a part of the work
environment than of the home environment."); Liebovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp.
2d 144, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (discussing associational losses when plaintiff is a women witnessing
other women being sexually harassed).
52. 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971). See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 ("Hackett v. McGuire Bros.,
Inc., which dealt with the phrase that allowed a suit to be started 'by a person claiming to be aggrieved'
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, concluded that the words used showed 'a congressional intention
to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article II of the Constitution."') (citations omitted).
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."3 Hackett had been decided by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit a year before Trafficante. It also focused
on standing to assert a claim of racial discrimination,54 but in housing, of course,
because Title VII governs the workplace."
Mr. Hackett, an African-American and a former employee of McGuire
Brothers, claimed that he had been the victim of discrimination and consequently
discharged by his employer because of his race. 6 Mr. Hackett pursued his claim
before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.57 After the Commission's
"finding of no reasonable cause," and before filing suit, Mr. Hackett applied for
and received a union pension. 8 As a pensioner, a district court ruled, Mr. Hackett
lacked standing to sue McGuire Brothers under Title VIIL 9
The district court was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.' The
appellate court's reasoning is clear. The district court had erroneously relied on the
definition section of Title VII rather than on its remedy section.61 While the
irrelevant definition section simply defines an employee as an individual employed
by an employer, the remedy section is significantly different. The remedy section
permits "a person claiming to be aggrieved" to file a charge and, after a specified
time, to initiate litigation under Title VII.
62
Because Title VII forbids unlawful racial discrimination by potential
employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies, 63 as well as employers,
53. See Hackett, 445 F.2d at 445-46. Prior to Hackett, at least one EEOC action addressed the issue
of whether a white employee had standing to sue for race discrimination against fellow African-
American employees. In this case, the EEOC proceeded to hear the charges. See White Employees
May File Charge Alleging Job Discrimination of Negro Workers, 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) § 6026 (July
8, 1969); see also Note, Work Environment Injury Under Title VII, 82 YALE L. J. 1695, 1695 (1973)
("This Note argues that Trafficante compels recognition of the theory that the 'conditions of
employment' language of Title VU protects the total work environment. Under this theory
discriminatory practices directed at one group taint the work environment and thereby cause injury to
all employees."); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972) (discussing a situation in which an Hispanic employee sued her employer under Title VII for
allegedly creating an offensive work environment by giving discriminatory service to Hispanic
customers).
54. See Hackett, 445 F.2d at 445. The issue in Hackett was whether a former employee, now a
pensioner, had standing to sue under Title VII for racial discrimination. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 444.
57. See id. at 444-45.
58. See id. at 445.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 446-47.
61. See id. at 445.
62. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994)).
63. See id. Title Vl's remedy provision provides the following:
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a
member of the Commission, alleging that an employer, employment agency, labor
organization, orjoint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training
or retraining, including on-the-job train programs, has engaged in an unlawful employment
268
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the appellate court concluded that "a person claiming to be aggrieved may never
have been an employee."'  As a result Mr. Hackett, although a pensioner at the
time of the suit, had standing to sue.65
III. WILL TRAFFICANTE AND HACKETT CONFER STANDING TO ALLEGE
TRANSFERRED IMPACT SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
Some comparisons between Trafficante and Hackett are obvious; both would
ultimately deal with alleged racial discrimination.' But when the foregoing are
compared with Childress I, other differences become evident. In neither
Trafficante nor Childress 6' is the plaintiff the direct object of a discriminatory
practice. But another distinction is less overt. Trafficante recognizes associational
rights68 while Childress I conferred a discriminatory-environment cause of action.69
Racial discrimination in the workplace is, of course, unlawful 0 and a hostile
work environment created by sexual harassment is also a form of unlawful
discrimination.7' That we need laws to protect each other from such conduct is an
unfortunate reality. The issue triggered by the Childress cases is who has judicial
practice ....
Title VIL 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
64. See Hackett, 445 F.2d at 445.
65. See id. at 446 ("We seriously doubt that the courts would recognize the validity of any pension
plan provision purporting to grant earned pension benefits on the condition that the recipient forego
access to the courts to redress past employment discrimination.").
66. See supra text accompanying notes 64-81.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
68. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,209-10 (1972) ("The alleged injury
to existing tenants by exclusion of minority persons from the apartment complex is the loss of important
benefits from interracial associations.").
69. See Childress I, 120 F.3d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'd per curiam, 134 F.3d 1205 (1998).
Because the purposes and relevant language in Title VII and Title VIII are so similar, we
believe we should begin by examining the Court's reasoning in Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. to determine whether the Supreme Court's recognition of associational rights
under Title VIII militates in favor of conferring a comparable discriminatory-environment
cause of action on men to complain about discrimination directed at women ....
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
70. See Title VIL 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a) (1994). This section states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
71. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) ("[A] claim of 'hostile
environment' sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is actionable under Title VII.").
standing; who can come before a court, allege such offensive conduct, and seek a
remedy.
The remedy section of Title VII, relied on by the Hackett court, simply states
that a "suit may be started by the person claiming to be aggrieved."72 The relevant
language in Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act, quoted in Trafficante, permits any
person to file a complaint who has been "injured by a discriminatory housing
practice or believes that he will be."73 Both cases, ultimately concerned with racial
discrimination, held that standing must be construed as "broadly as permitted by
Article III of the Constitution."'74 By citing Trafficante75 and quoting its acceptance
of the Hackett court's construction of Title VII,76 the Childress I court concluded
that a court must only consider Article III requirements for standing because it was
the intent of Congress to remove prudential standing requirements from the path
of any plaintiff alleging injury as the result of a Title VII violation.77 Analogical
reasoning to be sure, but is it worthy, and could it survive scrutiny before the
Supreme Court?
To answer these questions we must understand what Childress Iheld and what
it did not hold. Childress I did not hold that male officers can assert the rights of
their female co-workers.7 The court, in fact, agreed that they have no standing to
do this.79 Nor can these officers assert some vague right to be "free of tensions"
72. See Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 445 (3rd Cir. 1971) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5) ("The remedies section is § 706. That section permits 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' to
file a charge with the Commission." (citations omitted)).
73. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 207 (citing Section 810(a) of Title VIII). The Trafficante Court
further noted that "[any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice
or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about
to occur ... may file a complaint with the Secretary." Id. at 206.
74. Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446; see also Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209.
75. See Childress I, 120 F.3d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'd per curiam, 134 F.3d 1205 (1998)
("Trafficante's construction of the term 'person aggrieved' and the extension of Article III standing to
the victims of indirect discrimination has been adopted by every court of appeals that has considered
the issue of a white person's standing to sue under Title VII for associational or hostile environment
claims flowing from discriminatoryconduct directed at black persons.").
76. See id. at 480 ("[T]he [Trafficante] Court espoused the view of an appeals court [Hackett court]
that the phrase 'by a person claiming to be aggrieved," as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [the
same statute involved in the officers's suit], 'showed a congressional intention to define standing as
broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.").
77. See id. at 480-81. In its reasoning the Childress I court asserted that the adoption of the
Trafficante Court's broad standing rule on Title VII to the instant case was justified because of "the
similar language of the 1964 and 1968 statutes, the important enforcement role conferred on private
individuals in both statutory schemes, the citation of Hackett in Trafficante, the identity of the purposes
of each statute, and the.consistent interpretation by the EEOC." Id. at 481.
78. See id. at 479 ("To the extent that the male officers attempt to assert the rights of other persons,
female officers, they clearly state no claim.").
79. See id. ("Anyway their complaints are viewed, the male officers are attempting to recover for
violations of others peoples' civil rights, which they have no standing to do.").
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caused by their favorable treatment in the workplace."0 The issue in Childress I,
as framed by the appellate court, was to determine if the white male officers could
be "persons aggrieved" within the meaning of Title VII, and if so, could they have
suffered an injury actionable under Title VII."' Or, as the court stated, "[t]he
problem is standing."82 Then, as noted, principally relying on Trafficante, the court
held Title VII confers a "discriminatory-environment cause of action on men to
complain about discrimination directed at women." 3
There are, however, distinctions between Childress I and Trafficante, along
with the latter case's incorporation of Hackett. Trafficante "was the Supreme
Court's recognition of associational rights" and Trafficante and Hackett construed
a federal law aimed at race discrimination. 4 But Childress I goes beyond this.
There is no reason tc believe that other circuits or the Supreme Court will follow
this attempted lead. The distinction between Trafficante and Childress I, a review
of decisions from other circuits, and an examination of standing requirements
combine to foster this doubt.8 5
A. Accepted Requirements for Standing
Unless denied authority to do so by legislative action, 6 courts apply a two-step
standing analysis.8 7 The first step is rooted in Article III of the Constitution. 8 The
second considers the prudence of judicial intervention. 9 Prudential requirements
80. See id. ("To the extent they assert a general Title VII right to be free of tensions caused by
special treatment in their favor, the male officers' complaints should be dismissed because they attempt
to create a new Title VII right out of whole cloth.").
81. See id. at 480 ("We need to determine whether the plaintiffs are 'persons aggrieved' and, if so,
whether they have suffered an injury that would entitle them to bring this action.").
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 86-147.
86. See Yang, supra note 32, at 1361 ("Congress may remove all prudential standing requirements
through legislation, leaving only the Article III requirements."). One commentator noted the following:
A statute can modify standing principles in two different ways. First, a law can identify a
"right" the violation of which constitutes an injury "in fact." Second, Congress can, in passing
a statute, instruct the courts to ignore any prudential limitation on standing, and to consider
any case brought by a plaintiff who can meet the Article it minimum requirements.
Rosman, supra note 36, at 556-57.
87. See Yang, supra note 32, at 1361 ("In addition to Article III requirements for standing, courts
examine prudential standing requirements.").
88. See U.S. CONST. art. MI, § 2.
89. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (recognizing that apart from the minimal
Constitutional mandate "other limits on the class of persons who may invoke the courts' decisional and
remedial powers").
for standing were developed to foster judicial self-restraint.90 These requirements
permit a court to ask if judicial review is prudent for certain litigants,"' such as the
police officers in Childress ,2 while considering the limitations of judicial
resources, court congestion, and, as must be considered when construing legislation
such as Title VII and VIII, congressional intent.93
Plaintiffs, at a minimum, must meet the three Article III requirements to ensure
standing. 4 First, plaintiffs must establish "a distinct and palpable injury."95 This
requirement is most easily satisfied by alleging an infringement of an economic
interest in civil cases.96
It becomes important to recall that in Trafficante the plaintiffs alleged that a
denial of their associational rights resulted in "missed business and professional
advantages" and that they had suffered "economic damage" as the result of living
in a "white ghetto."97 In Hackett the plaintiff had lost his job, alleged he "accepted
the pension out of dire necessity,"98 and sued in part, for "back pay."99 In Childress
I the white officers alleged "loss of teamwork" as their injury."°
Second, the plaintiff must show "his injury was a probable result of the
challenged action..... The Childress I court itself was compelled to note that "we
do not express an opinion on whether the injury alleged... would satisfy Article
III's requirement of an injury 'fairly traceable' to the challenged action."' 02
The final Article III requirement for standing considers redressability by
90. See Egan, supra note 35, at 727 (discussing public policy reasons for prudential standing
requirements which courts have imposed on themselves).
91. See Rosman, supra note 36, at 551. Although the kind of litigants prudential rules are applied
to is not complete, the Supreme Court often cites three: those litigants who should not assert the rights
of third parties; litigants who should not assert "generalized grievances," and those in which the injury
claimed is not in the "'zone of interests' of the statute or provision in question." See id. Because of
the lack of in unambiguous rule regarding standing requirements "few hold the internal coherence of
that doctrine in high regard." See id. at 550. Even the Supreme Court has pronounced the concept
elusive. See id. (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
The Camp Court stated that "generalizations about standing... are largely worthless as such." Camp,
397 U.S. at 151; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("[The standing doctrine]
incorporates concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition... [which] cannot be defined
so as to make application of the constitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise.").
92. See Childress I, 120 F.3d 476,477-78 (4thCir. 1997), rev'dpercuriam, 134F.3d 1205 (1998).
An argument could be made that the white police officers in Childress I fell within the second and third
class of litigants. That is, it could be argued that they asserted a "generalized grievance" or that they
may or may not have been within the "zone of interests" protected by Title VII.
93. See Yang, supra note 32, at 1361.
94. See id. at 1359.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972).
98. See Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3rd Cir. 1971).
99. See id. at 444.
100. See Childress I, 120 F.3d 476,481 n.8 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'dper curiam, 134 F.3d 1205 (1998).
101. Yang, supra note 32, at 1360.
102. Childress 1, 120 F.3d at 481 n.8.
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determining "whether a favorable court decision will remedy the injury suffered by
the plaintiff."1 °3 As one commentator noted "[q]uite simply, courts conclude that
nothing can be done by the judiciary to help the plaintiffs."" 4
Obviously, reinstatement to his former position would have done something
for Mr. Hackett, who had alleged he accepted his pension out of necessity' °5 and
providing the benefits from interracial associations would have satisfied the
plaintiffs in Trafficante." What a court could have done for the white officers as
the result of a favorable decision in Childress I is speculative. For example, could
a court accept the argument that quashing a sexually hostile work environment
would overcome the reluctance of police officers in one group to assist another
group of officers that were performing their duties on the streets? 07
It becomes apparent that, even in the Fourth Circuit, a Childress-based cause
of action may not survive an application of the basic Article III test for standing to
sue. This question, on remand, would and should have been left for the district
court's determination. 0 8
There is, however, some reason to conclude that Childress I would have
satisfied Article III. The appellate court interpreted Trafficante as conferring a
"broad standing rule on Title VII cases"' 1 9 generally, and elected to disregard the
fact that in Trafficante this was done only "insofar as tenants of the same housing
unit" were concerned with implementing associational rights and abolishing the
consequence of racial discrimination."0 If these constraints prove immaterial,
Article III will not deter Childress-type litigation. Still, there is a second
procedural issue unresolved by Childress I. In contrast to its acknowledgment of
Article III requirements, Childress I failed to suggest the application of prudential
requirements."' The majority opinion repeated this flaw in Childress H."2
103. Yang, supra note 32, at 1360-61.
104. Id.
105. See Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3rd Cir. 1971).
106. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
107. See Childress 1, 120 F.3d at 478.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 481.
110. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209.
111. See Childress 1, 120 F.3d at 481 (holding that the plaintiffs had standing under Article In but
did not address the issue of prudential standing).
112. See Childress H, 134 F.3d 1205, 1206-07 (4th Cir. 1998). The concurring opinion, however,
addressed the issue of prudential standing. See id. at 1208-10 (Luttig, J., concurring).
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B. Should Prudential Standing Requirements Be Applied to Transferred
Impact Sexual Harassment Cases?
When applicable, prudential standing requirements must also be met, beyond
those imposed by Article III. In Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood,"3 the Supreme
Court noted that "[e]ven when a case falls within these constitutional boundaries,
a plaintiff may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the
judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import.""' 4 This
principle would limit access to federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert
a claim rather than one shared in substantially equal measure by a large class. 115
Thus, although a plaintiff may allege an injury sufficient to meet the
requirements of Article III, it does not necessarily follow that the legislation at
issue has given that party a cause of action." 6 Congress may, however, by
legislation, remove prudential standing requirements leaving only Article III
requirements to be met." 7 Both Trafficante and Hackett have been cited by one
commentator as demonstrating this with respect to both Titles VIII and VII
respectively. 8
The Hackett court noted that "the language 'a person claiming to be aggrieved'
[in Title VII] shows a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is
permitted by Article III.". The Trafficante Court, in applying congressional intent
to Title VIII, reached the same conclusion 2 ° as did the circuit court in Hackett. 2'
But will this "generous construction" found in Trafficante prevail when the alleged
113. 441U.S.91 (1978).
114. See id. at 99.
115. Seeid. at99-100.
116. See, e.g., Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268,
1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Though the [Fair Employment] Council has adequately alleged an 'injury in
fact' sufficient to meet the requirements of Article I, this does not necessarily mean that Congress has
conferred a cause of action upon it.").
117. See Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100. The Gladstone Court stated that "Congress may, by legislation,
expand standing to the full extent permitted by Article 1I, thus permitting litigation by one 'who
otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules."' Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
501 (1975)).
118. See Rosman, supra note 36, at 557.
[T]he Court concluded that Congress intended to define standing under Section 3610 [of Title
VIII] 'as broadly as is permitted by Article I of the Constitution.' In that last cited phrase,
the Court quoted Hackett v. McGuire Bros., a case in which the Third Circuit had held that
the standing provisions of Title VII were as broad as Article III permitted.
Id. at 558.
119. Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3rd Cir. 1971) (citation omitted).
120. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) ("With respect to suits
brought under the 1969 Act, we reach the same conclusion, insofar as tenants of the same housing unit
that is charged with discrimination are concerned.").
121. See Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446 ("'[A] person claiming to be aggrieved' shows a congressional
intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article II of the Constitution.").
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discriminatory actions undergirding a male's claim of hostile environment are
directed at women or will courts be permitted to assess the litigants best suited to
assert such a claim?
122
Even assuming that plaintiffs in a Childress-type case can establish Article III
standing, there are persuasive arguments that they must also be compelled to satisfy
prudential standing requirements. 123 These arguments are found, in part, in the text
of Title VII,'24 case law interpreting that statute,125 and by a review of congressio-
nal intent when sex discrimination was added to Title VII's prohibitions. 26
IV. HAS TITLE VII BEEN ACCEPTED AS SUPPORTING CHILDRESS I?
A. Case Law
Waters v. Heublin, Inc.127 was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in 1976, four years after the Supreme Court's decision in Trafficante. It is cited in
Childress j 128 The issue in Waters focused on the standing of a white woman to
sue her employer for race discrimination directed at African and Hispanic
Americans. 29 Although noting that Trafficante concerned racial discrimination in
housing, the court found Trafficante "logically indistinguishable" from the case
before it and held that Ms. Waters had standing to allege race discrimination under
Title VII. 3 °
The Waters court, however, clearly indicated that Trafficante left its discretion
to construe the application of Title VII to other actions under Title VII, such as
sexual harassment, intact.' 3 1 The court stated that "[lt is important to note the
122. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212 ("We can give vitality to § 810(a) only by a generous
construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by racial
discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of the statute.").
123. See infra notes 199-216 and accompanying text.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 162-77.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 128-47.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 148-61.
127. 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976).
128. See Childress I, 120 F.3d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'd per curiam, 134 F.3d 1205 (1998).
129. See Waters, 547 F.2d at 469.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 470. The Waters court cited a case involving gender discrimination in which it
referred to "casual dictum" supported by no cited authority in EEOC v. Occidental Life Insurance Co.
of California and stated that it "should not be followed here." See Waters, 547 F.2d at 470 n. 1 ("It
remains true that Ms. Edelson would not have had 'standing' to charge Occidental with discrimination
against unmarried female employees (Ms. Edelson was married), or against male employees with respect
to retirement."); see also EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 535 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 1976).
275
limits of our decision" and that it held "only that Waters has standing to sue to
redress racial and ethnic discrimination. 132 Waters does not support Childress I. 13
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bailey Co. Inc. 1' was decided
by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit one year after Waters. The relevant
question presented in Bailey was whether Ms. Wade, a white female, had standing
under Title VII to file a charge with the EEOC, alleging race discrimination against
blacks by her employer. 1
35
In Bailey a reluctant court, citing Trafficante and Waters, 136 held that Ms.
Wade "who may have suffered from the loss of benefits from the lack of
association with racial minorities" had standing. 1
37
The Bailey court, as the Waters court before it, indicated that Trafficante had
left intact the discretion for courts to construe Title VII to apply to matters other
than racial discrimination.' Specifically, the Bailey court wrote "we pass no
judgement on the question whether a male could file charges alleging sex
discrimination against females."'
139
Almost exactly three years after Bailey, in 1980, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mississippi
College.4 ° Again, citing the construction of Title VII found in the union of
Hackett and Trafficante, the court allowed standing for a white woman to file a
charge asserting that her employer discriminated against blacks. 4 ' The ruling was
132. Waters, 547 F.2d at 470.
133. The distinction made between Waters, which allows for persons claiming to be aggrieved under
Title VII by race discrimination and cases, like Childress 1, which allow standing to sue for
discriminatory-environment under Title VII for sexual harassment, can be supported by a number of
other lower court cases which also involved gender discrimination, albeit not sexual harassment. See,
e.g., Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Col., 803 F.2d 476,479 (9th Cir. 1986) (disallowing standing
to male maintenance administrators who claimed that their salaries were illegally lowered after they
were put into a traditional female job groups); Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686,709 (9th
Cir. 1984) (disallowing standing to a male faculty member of a nursing school who alleged his salary
was illegally lower than others because it was "infected" by discrimination the female faculty members
had received); Siegal v. Board of Educ. of New York, 713 F. Supp. 54, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1989),
(disallowing elementary school principals standing after they alleged they were the victims of sex
discrimination against women who traditionally held those positions because they were paid less than
high school principals); American Fed'n State, County and Mun. Employees v. County of Nassau, 664
F. Supp. 64,66 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (disallowing standing for male plaintiffs who claimed they were losing
money by being trapped in a lower paying female work group).
134. 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977).
135. Seeid.at451.
136. See id. at 452. Although the Bailey court was less than enthusiastic about its decision, it felt
bound by Trafficante. The court stated that "[w]e would be inclined to agree with appellee were it not
for the Supreme Court's decision in Trafficante." Id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 452-54.
139. Id. at 454.
140. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
141. See id. at 483 ("We conclude that § 706 of Title VII permits Summers to file a charge asserting
that Mississippi College discriminates against blacks on the basis of race in recruitment and hiring.").
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made not to allow the assertion of others' rights, but for the loss of important
benefits from interracial associations. 4 2 That ruling is clearly confined to the
concept of associational rights.'43 Provided the plaintiff "meets the standing
requirements imposed by Article III," she may assert "her own personal right to
work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination."'"
As in Bailey, the court in Mississippi College refused to address "any form of
discrimination other than racial discrimination."'45 The Fifth Circuit also indicated
that Trafficante left intact that court's discretion to construe Title VII to apply to
matters other than racial discrimination.
Trafficante and Hackett'" have unquestionably resolved the issue of standing
to allege race discrimination in violation of Title VIII and VII respectively. Only
the constitutional requirements of Article III must be met. Thus, prudential
standing requirements will not be invoked to preclude judicial resolution of alleged
race discrimination.
The cases that follow Trafficante, however, suggest that the standing
requirement prescribed for allegations of race discrimination may differ from those
used to resolve issues of sex discrimination under Title VII, thus allowing courts
to apply prudential standards.' 47 An examination of congressional intent also
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 483 n.8. The court further stated:
We decide on the issue before us of whether a white employee can charge her employer with
discriminating against blacks in violation of Title VII. We expressly pretermit the question
of whether any form of discrimination other than racial discrimination can be charged by a
person who is not a member of the group against whom the discrimination is directed.
Id. (citing EEOC v. Bailey, 563 F.2d 439, 454 n.9 (6th Cir. 1977)).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 68-85.
147. Indeed the courts have drawn distinctions between what constitutes racial harassment and sexual
harassment, which may further advance the argument that prudential standing should be applied to
sexual harassment claims even if it is not applied to racial harassment claims. For example, in Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court's first sexual harassment case after Meritor Savings Bank,
the Court stated: "As we pointed out in Meritor, 'mere utterance of an ... epithet which engenders
offensive feelings in a employee,' does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate
Title VII." See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); see also Lehman v. Toys 'R Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445,445 (N.J. 1993)
("Although it will be a rare and extreme case in which a single incident will be so severe that it would,
from the perspective of a reasonable woman, make the working environment hostile, such a case is
certainly possible."). In contrast, a number of courts have ruled that a single racial epithet might be
actionable under Title VII or equivalent state civil rights laws. See, e.g., Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d
685, 694 (N.J. 1998) (overruling a summary judgment in defendant's favor under a New Jersey civil
rights statute modeled on Title VII and stating: "[a] rational factfinder, crediting plaintiffs evidence,
could conclude that defendant engaged in discriminatory harassment by uttering a racial epithet that
was sufficiently severe to have created a hostile work environment"); Reid v. O'Leary, No. 96-401,
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supports acknowledging this distinction.
B. Congressional Intent
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 4 ' was decided by the Supreme Court in
1986. In a comment by Justice Rehnquist, the Meritor Court held that sex
discrimination could take the form of hostile environment sexual harassment,
differentiating sex discrimination from other prohibitions under Title VI.'49
Referring to Title VII, Justice Rehnquist noted that sex was added to the Act at
"the last minute" and "the bill was quickly passed" with "little legislative
history."' ° He could have said with really no legislative history.
Including the term "sex" in Title VII was the result of an amendment proposed
by Congressman Howard (Judge) Smith (D-Va.) to what was at the time, H.R.
7152.51 The Judge was an 80-year-old segregationist'5 2 and the amendment was
a "trump card he had been waiting so long to play."' 53 He intended to make H.R.
7152 so controversial that it would be defeated.'54 Indeed, after his amendment
was introduced "[t]he house erupted in shock."' 5 There is little record of debate
over the amendment, and there is no mention of "sex" in the Legislative History of
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10627, at *9-10 (D.C.C. July 15, 1996) (refusing to grant a summary judgment,
stating that "[i]t is very possible that the term 'Coon-Ass' is racially derogatory or severe enough, in
and or itself, to create a hostile work environment."); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2338 (1989) ("However
irrational racist speech may be, it hits right at the emotional place where we feel the most pain.");
Charles R. Lawrence II, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 431, 452 ("The experience of being called 'nigger,' 'spic,' 'Jap,' or 'kike,' is like receiving a slap
in the face. The injury is instantaneous.").
148. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
149. See id. at 73.
150. See id. at 63; see also Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp. 2d 144, 149
(E.D.N.Y. 1998). The Leibovitz court observed:
Neither the language of this statute nor its legislative history is conclusive. "Sex" was added
by Congress to Title VH at the last minute, with minimal debate and great celerity. Legislators
supporting the measure acted to eliminate inequality in the workplace based on gender with
respect to hiring, promotion, pay, and task assignment. Beyond these relatively immediate
concerns, their design is unknown. Given that it was a large step towards equality to guarantee
women pay parity for equal work, it is unlikely that the enacting legislators envisioned how
much further the Act's language could reach. Talk of intent is futile.
Id. (citations omitted).
151. See CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALAN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115 (1985).
152. See id. at 84. Smith was also a very influential member of Congress serving as Chairman of
the Rules Committee. See id. As a member of the House for 33 years, he was perhaps the most
powerful person in the House. See id.
153. Seeid. atll5.
154. See id. at 116.
155. See id. at 115.
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964.156 There was, however, a spontaneous bipartisan
coalition of congresswomen who claimed entitlement "to this little crumb of
equality."' 57
"Pandemonium reigned" as the predominately male House of Representatives
was unexpectedly compelled to take a stand for or against women, knowing that to
stand against women "would alienate most women in the country." '158 As one
House member came to note "Smith outsmarted himself. At this point there was
no way you could sink the bill."'59 That "little crumb of equality" approved by a
"befuddled" Congress had suddenly become "a precursor of women's
liberation.' ' "6
However, nothing can be gleaned from any record of congressional actions that
precludes the consideration of prudential standing requirements in Title VII sexual
harassment cases. To the contrary, "sex" was added to Title VII as an unexpected
amendment after thoughtful consideration of race and color.'6
C. Text of Title VII
With Title VII Congress intended to confer the strictest protection against race
and color classifications. 61 The Supreme Court, in Trafficante, enforced this goal
156. See CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong. 2d (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355-2519 (1964).
157. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 151, at 117.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 118.
161. The bill was introduced to the House on June 26, 1963. See id. at 2. "Sex" was added to the
bill on February 7, 1964. See id. at 114. Three days later, on February 10, 1964, the bill was passed
by the House and sent to the Senate. See id. at 118-23. President Johnson signed the bill into law on
July 2, 1964. See id. at 228. Due to the hasty insertion of "sex" in the bill, there is no legislative history
regarding sexual harassment. Some commentators have argued that Congress never intended sexual
harassment to be covered under Title VII. See, e.g., John Cloud, Sex and the Law, TIME, Mar. 23, 1998,
at 49. Eugene Volokh, UCLA harassment law expert, made the following observation:
In 1964 [when discrimination based on gender first became illegal], if you told a member of
Congress, "If you voted to bar discrimination based on sex, you will prohibit employees from
putting pictures of their wives in bikinis on their desks," most legislators would have said,
"Wait a minute, where does it say that?"
Id. (quoting Eugene Volokh).
162. The original Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII protected classes based on race, color, religion
or national origin until the later and unexpected inclusion of "sex" into the bill. However, the civil
rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, in which African-Americans fought for their civil rights was
the primary impetus for the Act. See WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 151, at xiv-xix. In President
Kennedy's June 11, 1963 television speech, which he used to inform the nation of his desire to
introduce sweeping civil rights legislation (Civil Rights Act of 1964), he stated:
One hundred years of delay have passed since President Lincoln freed the slaves, yet their
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by revealing the associational rights of tenants in an apartment complex.
63
Moreover, color, although it overlaps with race, fortifies this protection."6 Race
and color classifications, in fact, are not limited to those commonly advanced by
ethnologists; they are broader. 165 Hispanic, as an example, would not be classified
as a race by an ethnologist, yet discrimination against an American Hispanic is a
form of race discrimination under Title VII. 166 Even discrimination based on subtle
race/color characteristics is forbidden under Title VII. 167 Discrimination, for
example, against a person of "swarthy" complexion is illegal. 6 '
Sex, on the other hand, has been more narrowly applied and construed. 69
Thus, although sex is defined by a dictionary in two acceptable ways: as a
"[d]ivision of organisms distinguished respectively as male or female" (gender),
and as the "sum of the structural, functional, and behavioral characteristics of
heirs, their grandsons, are not fully free. They are not yet freed from the bonds of injustice.
They are not yet freed from social and economic oppression. And this Nation, for all its hopes
and all its boasts, will not be fully free until all its citizens are free. Now the time has come
for this Nation to fulfill its promise. The events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so
increased the cries for equality that no city or state or legislative body can prudently choose
to ignore them.
Id. at xx.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29, 39-52.
164. See PLAYER, supra note 3, § 5.23, at 229-3 1.
165. See id.
166. See id. § 5.23, at 229 (citing Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir.
1979)).
167. See id. ("Persons from the Middle East may not be a distinct 'race.' Nonetheless, discrimination
against Semitic persons would be racial. Discrimination against indigenous Americans (Eskimos,
Native Hawaiians, Samoans, or American Indians) is a clear form of race discrimination.").
168. See id. § 5.23, at 229-30.
169. See id. § 5.25, at 239-40. "The narrow construction of 'sex' was pioneered in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, which held that pregnancy distinctions were not 'sex' distinctions." Id. Katherine M.
Franke, a prominent commentator, discussed how early cases involving sex-based harassment were
much like race-based harassment. She noted that sex and race cases were aimed at victims who
"violated gender and race norms." See Franke, supra note 10, at 710. Later sex cases, however,
departed from this norm when victimized woman were required to produce evidence that the "harassing
conduct was undertaken 'because of the target's sex."' See id. Franke further noted that cases
prohibited "not only sex harassment, but sexual harassment-that is, conduct of a sexual nature." Id.
Franke concluded that "while sexual harassment is similar to, it is not the same as racial harassment.
Many authorities might say that Title VII proscribes all, or virtually all, conduct of a racial nature in the
workplace, but few would argue that Title VII renders actionable all sexual conduct in the workplace."
Id. at 709 n.85. Recently, the Supreme Court reinforced Franke's contention that Title VII does not
render actionable all sexual conduct actionable. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv. Inc., 118 S.
Ct. 998, 1001-02 (1998). In Oncale, Justice Scalia opined that "the statute does not reach genuine but
innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and
of the opposite sex." Id. at 1002-03. Justice Scalia further stated, "We have always regarded that
requirement [conduct that is severe and pervasive enough to be objectively hostile or abusive] as
crucial, and as sufficient to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the
workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation-for discriminatory 'conditions of
employment."' Id. at 1003.
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living beings that subserve reproduction" (sexuality). '70 Congress "intended to
refer to the first, narrow definition, thus proscribing gender discrimination, but not
prohibiting discrimination based broadly upon sexuality, sexual practices, or sexual
preferences." 7'
Congress also drew a textual distinction between race and color and sex when
it created the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense.'72 Under a
BFOQ defense it is lawful to discriminate against a person based on his or her
sex, 173 provided it can be proven that "the excluded person could not safely and
effectively perform essential job duties,"' 74 "that all, or substantially all [persons]
in the class could not perform [the] essential job duties,"' 175 and that "there is no
reasonable alternative that would serve the employer's business needs equally
well."'
17 6
Race and color, on the other hand, share none of these exceptions. Congress,
in its determination to eliminate this form of discrimination, did not provide for
exceptions to race and color discrimination, not even narrow ones. 1
77
The foregoing support the argument that race/color and sex, as protected
classifications under Title VII, are distinguishable based on case law, congressional
intent, and the text of the statute. If courts find that prudential standards can be
applied to sex, what considerations might they apply to decide whether a particular
litigant in a Childress I-type case has standing to proceed? The evaluation of
judicial resources is certainly relevant.
170, See PLAYER, supra note 3, § 5.25, at 239 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
1062 (1976)).
171. Id.
172. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(e) (1994). Regarding the BFOQ, the statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees... on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise ....
Id.
173. It should be noted that the BFOQ defense is to be applied narrowly. See Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 332-34 (1977) (discussing narrow application of the BFOQ exception in sex
discrimination cases).
174. PLAYER, supra note 3, § 5.29b, at 281.
175. Id. § 5.29b, at 282.
176. Id.
177. Legislative history on the BFOQ defense is meager. Discussion, however, in the Congressional
Record alludes to legal approval of such employment practices as "male players for a professional
baseball team," and a French chef for a "French restaurant." See PLAYER, supra note 3, § 5.29(a), at
280.
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V. SHOULD JUDICIAL RESOURCES BE A FACTOR WHEN ASSESSING
PRUDENTIAL STANDING IN TRANSFERRED IMPACT CASES?
As noted earlier, courts consider various factors when deciding whether a party
has prudential standing.17 Among them are judicial resources.' 79 In Childress
scenarios, consideration of judicial resources may become a strong determining
factor.
Sexual harassment cases are rapidly becoming one of the most discussed and
visible topics in American society."'° Ever since Clarence Thomas' highly charged
and publicized Supreme Court hearings in 1991,81 it is quite likely that one will
read, almost daily, a story in the popular press about sexual harassment. Indeed,
the fact that some of the country's leaders, from President Clinton, in the Paula
Jones et. al. controversies, to Clarence Thomas and his past problem, have all
contributed to the issue's high visibility, making it the topic of frequent
comment.8 2
But those who feel they are victimized by sexual harassment are not merely
lamenting it, they are suing. Consider the following statistics. In 1991, 6,883
sexual harassment claims were filed with the EEOC. 3 But after the Clarence
Thomas hearings that year, claims swelled to over 15,300 by 1996.84 Sexual
178. See supra note 91 (discussing scenarios when prudential standing is often applied).
179. See id.; see also National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 892 F.2d 98,99 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(reviewing the issue of prudential standing in the context of creating a strain on judicial resources).
180. See John Leo, Every Man a Harasser?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 16, 1998, at 18 ("It
wasn't just Jay Leno and David Letterman, though they took the lead and set the tone [regarding the
alleged Monica Lewinsky affair]. The first week of the scandal was probably the decade's high-water
mark of euphoria around the water cooler.").
181. See, e.g., Marlene Cimons, The Click! Heard 'Round the Nation, L.A. TimES, Oct. 18, 1991,
at El; Derrick Z. Jackson, After the Thomas Affair, Progress-or Silence, Oct. 20, 1991, at A37; James
Warren, Coverage Offers Class on Sexual Harassment, CHi. TIm., Oct. 12,1991, atC1. One journalist
observed:
In 1991 the world watched, rapt with attention, as Anita Hill described her allegations of
sexual harassment against then-Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas. Back then, the
legal term 'sexual harassment' was a foreign notion to most men and women in the workplace.
Hill's testimony spawned thousands of successful claims that have compelled lawyers and
judges to settle enormously expensive claims and to define notions of appropriate behavior
between men and women.
Sonia Katyal, Victims Must Prove Sexual Preference ofHarassers, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 16, 1997,
at 9B.
182. See Del Jones & Stephanie Armour, Romance at Work Tricky to Manage: Even Consensual
Relationships Can Hurt Morale, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 23, 1998, at 2B ("The Clinton controversy, 'will
just add more fuel to the [sexual harassment] fire,' says Chicago employment lawyer Michael
Karpeles.").
183. Shaheena Ahmad, Get Your Sex Insurance Now, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., March 2, 1998,
at 61.
184. See id.
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harassment claims now show signs of leveling off at 15,889.185
And sexual harassment claims are not only numerous, they are expensive. One
estimate of the cost of litigating a sexual harassment suit ranged from $200,000t16
to $406,000, if the lawsuit went to trial. 7 Indeed, since the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which allows compensatory 18 as well as punitive damages
where the plaintiff's behavior is malicious or reckless,'89 the economic incentive
to sue has increased. 9" This, plus the fact that the parties may now have a jury
trial, only adds to the pressure put upon judicial resources.191
With these trends and conditions in mind, 92 an argument can be made that
sexual harassment claims will continue to constitute a sizable portion of lawsuits
filed, thereby imposing a very real strain on judicial resources. We are not,
however, arguing here that a judicial resources factor should be applied to those
who are directly the victims of sexual harassment' 93 Sexual harassment is a
185. See id. Sexual harassment cases, according to the EEOC, were "the fastest-growing area of
employment discrimination" in recent years. See Kirsten Downey Grimsley, Worker Bias Cases Are
Rising Steadily, New Laws Boost Hopes for Monetary Awards, WASH. POST, May 12, 1998, at Al.
186. See Jay Finegan, Law and Disorder; Employee Lawsuits, INC., Apr. 1994, at 68.
187. See Cary Stemle, Seminar Shows Ambiguity of Sexual-Harassment Cases, Bus. FIRST-
LOUISVILLE, Dec. 22, 1997, at 8.
188. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory damages include "future pecuniary losses,
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses...." See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994). In addition, a plaintiff can receive the
remedies available under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which can include backpay, interest on backpay,
and reinstatement. See 42 U.S.C § 198 1a(a)(1) ("[T]he complaining party may recover compensatory
and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized
by section 706(g) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)] of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.").
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a. Under the 1991 Act, compensatory damages are capped based on the
number of employees working for the defendant. See id. § 198 la(b)(3).
190. According to the Jury Research Institute, the average sexual harassment plaintiff is awarded
$256,000 if the party wins in court. See Steve Salerno, An End to Harassment Hysteria, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 31, 1998, at A22. Indeed, there may now be a more dependable "deep pocket" source to settle
sexual harassment claims in the future, giving even greater incentive to sue. The sale of employment
practices liability insurance (EPL), which covers sexual harassment, as well as other employment-
related lawsuits, have swelled. See Ahmad, supra note 183, at 61. One company which sells EPL
policies sold them to more than 500 mid-size companies, witnessing the doubling of sales every year.
See id.
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983(c) ("If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages
under this section-(1) any party may demand a trial by jury .... ).
192. Plaintiffs also enjoy success in prosecuting their cases. One source states that two-thirds of
sexual-harassment lawsuits that get to trial are won by plaintiffs. See Stemle, supra note 187, at 8.
193. Because prudential standing requirements are commonly applied by courts in three scenarios:
when a litigant asserts the rights of a third party, when a litigant asserts "generalized grievances," and
when there is an issue of whether a litigant is within a "zone of interests" of the statute or provision in
question, the issue of whether to apply prudential standing requirements to a direct victim of sexual
harassment would not be raised. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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serious problem in the workplace, and a victim must have access to court to resolve
this problem. However, we are contending that if standing is extended in an
unrestrained manner to a Childress I-type scenario, sexual harassment lawsuits
might increase exponentially. This would occur with the addition of a new group
of purported victims. In these situations, judges should be free to apply prudential
standards to determine whether the plaintiff has standing to sue for damages.
Indeed, there is no dearth of authority, even from the Supreme Court itself,
regarding how difficult hostile environment sexual harassment is to define.' 94 And
it appears that the theory is expanding. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has
now extended Title VII to same-sex sexual harassment.'95
With these uncertainties in mind, to allow an additional party,'96 a victim of
transferred impact, to only be required to satisfy Article III standing
requirements, 97 could open a potential floodgate of claims.'98 Judges should be
194. To date the Supreme Court has been unable, and perhaps will never be able, to define precisely
the difference between conduct that is merely offensive and conduct that is actionable under Title VII.
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the first Supreme Court sexual harassment case after Meritor Savings
Bank, the Court stated that there is no "mathematically precise test" for determining these distinctions.
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). Moreover, Justice Scalia in his concurrence
in Harris, stated that "[als a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually unguided juries decide
whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or omitted by) an employer is egregious enough to warrant an
award of damages." Id. at 24; see also Anne C. Levy, The United States Supreme court Opinion in
Harris v. Forklift Systems: Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 275, 296-
97 (1995) (discussing the lack of guidance by the Court in the Harris case); Eugene Volokh, Was Right
Wrong? Who Knows?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1998, at A18 ("The [sexual harassment law] is so mushy
that it really is a matter of which judge or jury you draw.").
195. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998); see also supra text
accompanying notes 11-12.
196. A number of commentators have argued that sexual harassment cases are being asserted by
some for political reasons, rather than to redress actual sexual harassment. Assuming this to be true,
the addition of another party might also increase the likelihood of sexual harassment suits. See, e.g.,
Leo, supra note 180, at 18 ("Sexual-harassment litigation can now be part of partisan politics as usual.
With deep-pocket contributors behind you, and on your allegations alone, you can depose a politician
about his sex life and perhaps force him to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars defending himself
in court."); see also Jim Impoco, The Mother ofAll Wedge Issues, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 5,
1995, at 31 (discussing how two California professors who authored the California Civil Rights
Initiative will be investigated by a state Democratic Party official as to whether they have ever
"inappropriately touched students"). The popular press has also reported how sexual harassment claims
have been apparently leveled against others in the workplace for purposes of impairing or even
destroying that worker's career. See, e.g., Judy Peres, Few Remedies to False Claims of Harassment,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 20, 1998, at 1.
197. A useful analogy between a Childress I-type case and tort law might be illustrative.
Traditionally, under tort law an observer of an accident caused by another's negligence is denied
standing to sue, even if the accident caused the observer to suffer mental distress. If all observers of
accidents were allowed to do so, it would impose a great strain on the resources of the court. See, e.g.,
KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 54, at 366. Discussing the issue of peril or harm to another after a party
witnesses it, Prosser and Keeton argue:
If recovery is to be permitted, however, it is also clear that there must be some limitation. It
would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the defendant who has
endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other
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free to consider how such claims will affect the management of judicial resources.
VI. CONCLUSION
Childress I was overruled by Childress H when the full Fourth Circuit Court
reversed its three judge panel and affirmed the "district court's judgment in its
entirety."'99  As a result, the Circuit Court dismissed the plaintiff's hostile
environment claim because "the prevailing rule is that Title VII addresses only
discrimination between sexes." 2' The approach taken by the Fourth Circuit, and
therefore the district court, has now been overruled by the Supreme Court with the
recent opinion issued in Oncale.2 °' Title VII, it has been revealed, applies to same-
sex sexual harassment. As a result, the Childress Ireasoning has been resuscitated.
The unusual allegations advanced by the white male officers in Childress has
provoked thought. Judicial opinions,0 2 commentary and the legal popular press
reflect this fact,2"3 along with the fact that reasonable minds do differ. We
conclude, however, that a reasonable solution to the conundrum presented by
Oncale and the four Childress decisions has remained unarticulated. And we
conclude that a practical solution can be supported by a review of Trafficante,2 °
circuit court decisions,2"5 the text of Title VII, 2°6 and a realistic assessment of
congressional intent.20 7
Three circuit court judges, concurring in Childress II, recognized the
significance of prudential standing requirements in addition to those required by
person disturbed by reason of it, including every bystander shocked at an accident, and every
distant relative of the person injured, as well as all his friends.
Id.
198. The "floodgate" argument was advanced in National Federation of Federal Employees v.
Cheney, 892 F.2d 98, 99-100 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Mikva, J., dissenting) ("The court's warning that
allowing petitioners standing would 'eviscerate the prudential standing test,' rings hollow. Adopting
the role of floodgate attendant, the court asserts that would-be plaintiffs could claim standing to
challenge any agency action ..... ). Prosser and Keeton assert an analogous floodgate-like argument
for allowing third party claims in tort: "And probably the danger of fictitious claims, and the necessity
of some guarantee of genuineness, are even greater here than before. It is no doubt such considerations
that have made the law extremely cautious in extending its protection to the bystander." KEETON ET
AL., supra note 3, § 54, at 366.
199. See supra note 6.
200. See supra note 7.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
203. See supra notes 9-10.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 66-85.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 127-46.
206. See supra text accompanying 162-77.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 148-61.
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Article III. These judges asserted that in Title VII litigation plaintiffs must "satisfy
both types of standing requirements-Constitutional and prudential."2 °8 These
jurists are painting with too broad of a brush. 9
The Supreme Court, as noted, concluded that Hackett revealed that, with
respect to associational rights, Title VII conferred "standing as broadly as permitted
by Article III"2' ° and then approvingly revealed "the same conclusion"2"' with
respect to tenants in a housing project.
This reasoning, however, does not undermine the position taken here.
Prudential standing requirements should be applied in cases other than those
alleging race and color discrimination under Title VII. Neither Hackett nor
Trafficante preclude this conclusion. Nor is there any prevailing view that it is
unworkable.212
Three circuit courts, while broadly construing standing requirements in cases
alleging race discrimination under Title VII, have kept their discretion intact by
expressly refusing to provide even dicta related to the transferred impact issue
raised by Childress P.23
It is our position that neither Childress I nor II articulated ajust or appropriate
standing requirement. Of course, Article III standing requirements must be met.
In Childress I the appellate court, quite properly, called upon the district court to
resolve this issue.214 The lower court should also have been free to consider
prudential standing requirements. Childress ll again failed to direct this reasonable
two-step process.
215
Assuming a Childress-type case can satisfy Article III, it is possible that the
plaintiffs can also demonstrate it is prudent for the court to permit them to proceed.
This, we proffer, can and should be assessed on the facts of individual cases.
In Childress I, as an example, the white male officers may have been able to
establish that sexual discrimination, allegedly directed at females, plausibly
fostered a danger that demonstrably impaired the performance of their work. If so,
arguably they were injured by conduct prohibited by Title VII. Conversely, it
would be conceivable for a court to rule that, in this particular case, the female
officers would be the appropriate plaintiffs and that the male officers were merely
incidental beneficiaries of Title VII protections.
This is legitimate work for courts. In the absence of clear congressional intent
or a Supreme Court ruling that precludes them from doing so, courts should not
shed their authority to consider prudential standing requirements in Title VII
208. Childress fl, 134 F.3d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1998) (Luttig, J., concurring).
209. See infra text accompanying notes 210-15.
210. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972); see also supra text
accompanying notes 52-53.
211. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209.
212. See supra notes 66-85.
213. See supra notes 127-45.
214. See Childress I, 120 F.3d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'd per curiam, 134 F.3d 1205 (1998).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
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litigation. With the exception of allegations of race or color discrimination, neither
Title VII, nor any precedent considering it, weaken this conclusion.
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